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when analyzing a request to equitably subordinate a claim. Part II analyzes what constitutes
inequitable conduct. Part III explores when inequitable conduct actually causes an injury to
another creditor or confers an unfair advantage on the claimant.
Discussion
I.

The Equitable Subordination Test is Uniform.
Section 510(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides “[a court may] under principles of

equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim
to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another
allowed interest.”4 The equitable subordination test was created by the Fifth Circuit in Benjamin
v. Diamond, which has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court and uniformly adopted by
other courts.5 A court will generally subordinate a claim if a party demonstrates that (1) the
claimant engaged in some type of inequitable conduct; (2) the misconduct resulted in injury to
the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; and (3) equitable
subordination of the claim would not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.6 The third element, “has been read as a ‘reminder to the bankruptcy court that although it
is a court of equity, it is not free to adjust the legally valid claim of an innocent party who asserts
the claim in good faith merely because the court perceives that the result is inequitable.’”7 All the
elements of equitable subordination are required in order for a court to equitably subordinate a
claim.8

4

11 U.S.C. § 510 (2018).
Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1977); see Noland, 517 U.S. at
538–39.
6
Shubert v. Lucent Techs. Inc (In re Winstar Commc’ns, Inc.), 554 F.3d 382, 411 (3d Cir. 2009).
7
Noland, 517 U.S. at 539 (quoting Andrew DeNatale, Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination
as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 BUS. LAW. 417, 428 (1985)).
8
See In re Mid-Am. Waste Sys., 284 B.R. 53, 71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
5
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Finding Inequitable Conduct Depends on the Level of Scrutiny the Court Applies.
A. Insider Status Determines the Level of Scrutiny a Court Applies and Changes the
Burden in Most Jurisdictions.
In a majority of jurisdictions, the level of scrutiny a court applies depends upon whether
the claimant is an insider.9 “Insider” is a defined in the Bankruptcy Code and includes a director
of a corporation, an officer of a corporation, a person in control of the debtor, and a relative of a
general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.10 However, the list is not an
exclusive list, and courts determine whether someone is an insider on a case-by-case basis.11
Courts consider what level of control the claimant had in determining whether the claimant is an
insider.12 Generally, creditors do not have fiduciary responsibilities to their debtors and are
therefore not insiders.13 However, “[w]here the creditor controls the corporate debtor by voting
control of its stock, dominant influence in its management or ability otherwise to control its
business affairs, the creditor may have a fiduciary duty to its corporate debtor” and could be
considered an insider.14 In N & D Properties, a shareholder became an insider when she retained
legal counsel to evaluate the company’s options and attempted to negotiate an extension of the
debtor’s loans.15 In that case, a minority shareholder became an insider before she was even a
director.16 In contrast, the court in In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc. found that a creditor was not an
insider because the creditor “did not participate in the debtor's management, determine its

9

See Fabricators, Inc. v. Tech. Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458, 1465 (5th Cir. 1991).
11 U.S.C. 101(31).
11
In re Friedman, 126 B.R. 63, 69 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991); In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc., 161 B.R. 107, 118 (E.D.
Pa. 1993).
12
See Estes v. N & D Props., Inc. (In re N & D Props., Inc.), 799 F.2d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 1986).
13
In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 29 B.R. 139, 170 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
14
Id. (quoting Margaret H. Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Interference with the
Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 BUS. LAW. 343, 352, 365 (1975)).
15
In re N & D Props., 799 F.2d at 732.
16
Id.
10
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operating decisions, or have any presence on its board.”17 Although the claimant monitored the
debtor’s business for the most opportune time to foreclose, the court found this did not constitute
control of the debtor making the claimant an insider.18
In a majority of jurisdictions, insiders are subject to heightened scrutiny because they
have a fiduciary duty to the debtor or they exercise some control over the debtor.19 Insiders are
subject to heightened scrutiny when a party moves to equitably subordinate an insider’s claim.20
Non-insiders are subject to less scrutiny, and a moving party must show more egregious conduct
such as fraud, spoilation or overreaching, to meet the heightened standard of inequitable conduct
for a non-insider.21 “For claims against insiders only, the party seeking to subordinate a claim
bears the burden to show material evidence of inequitable conduct, but once inequitable conduct
has been demonstrated, the claimant bears the burden of showing that the transaction was fair.”22
Unlike claims against insiders, the burden is always on the one seeking to subordinate the claim
to prove the higher level of egregious conduct has occurred for non-insiders.23
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals last heard an equitable subordination case in 1978,
and the court did not address what level of inequitable conduct is necessary to subordinate a
claim for insiders and non-insiders.24 In the Southern District of New York, there is no

17

In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc., 161 B.R. at 118.
Id.
19
See Boyajian v. DeFusco (In re Giorgio), 862 F.2d 933, 939 (1st Cir. 1988); Shubert v. Lucent Techs. Inc (In re
Winstar Commc’ns., Inc.), 554 F.3d 382, 412 (3d Cir. 2009); EEE Comm. Corp. v. Holmes (In re ASI Reactivation,
Inc.), 934 F.2d 1315, 1323 (4th Cir. 1991); Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Foods, Inc. (In re Herby's Foods), 2 F.3d
128, 131 (5th Cir. 1993); First Nat'l Bank v. Rafoth (In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs.), 974 F.2d 712, 718 (6th Cir.
1992); In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., 728 F.3d 660, 669–72 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing the District Court’s factual
findings, but remaining silent on the District Court’s use of the heightened standard for non-insiders); In re Bellanca
Aircraft Corp., 850 F.2d 1275, 1282 (8th Cir. 1988); Henry v. Lehman Commer. Paper, Inc. (In re First All. Mortg.
Co.), 471 F.3d 977, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006); Sender v. Bronze Grp., Ltd. (In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., Inc.), 380
F.3d 1292, 1301 (10th Cir. 2004); In re N & D Props., Inc., 799 F.2d at 731.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
In re N & D Props., Inc., 799 F.2d at 731.
23
Id.
24
Jezarian v. Raichle (In re Stirling Homex Corp.), 579 F.2d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 1978).
18

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

heightened or different standard for non-insiders.25 However, a bankruptcy court in the Southern
District of New York acknowledged that “there may be fewer traditional grounds available [to
subordinate the claim of a non-insider] because neither undercapitalization nor breach of
fiduciary duty applies to the conduct of a non-insider.”26 The Southern District of New York is
unique in declining to apply different levels of scrutiny, even in the Second Circuit.27
B. Non-Insiders are Rarely Found to Have Engaged in Inequitable Conduct due to a
Heightened Threshold of Inequitable Conduct and Less Scrutiny
For non-insiders, more egregious conduct, such as fraud, spoilation or overreaching, is
required to show inequitable conduct.28 This egregious conduct must be shown with
particularity.29 Claims against non-insiders require a higher level of proof.30 In Osborne, the
court found that one non-insider secured creditor acted inequitably toward another unsecured
creditor by deliberately misleading the unsecured creditor into believing that the debtor would be
able to pay its debts.31 The court reasoned that the secured creditor had superior knowledge and
acted for its own benefit by falsely inducing the unsecured creditor to continue to supply the
debtor when the secured creditor knew the debtor would not be able to pay.32
However, claims of non-insiders are rarely subordinated because of the higher threshold
required to show inequitable conduct.33 In In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc, the unsecured creditors
argued that a secured creditor’s conduct was inequitable because “it embarked on a policy to
garner additional information so as to exercise its contractual rights not to lend at a propitious

25

In re LightSquared Inc., 511 B.R. 253, 348 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id.
27
In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 29 B.R. 139, 169 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Mayo, 112 B.R. 607, 650 (Bankr. D.
Vt. 1990).
28
In re N & D Props., Inc., 799 F.2d at 731.
29
Id.
30
Henry, 471 F.3d at 1006 (citing In re Pac. Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 116 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986).
31
In re Osborne, 42 B.R. 988, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
32
Id.
33
In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc., 161 B.R. 107, 118 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
26
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time relative to the other unsecured creditors.”34 The secured creditor extended additional credit
to the debtor when it was advantageous to the debtor, but then the secured creditor foreclosed
when it was advantageous for itself to foreclose, to the detriment of the unsecured creditors.35
The court held it is not inequitable for the claimant, a non-insider secured creditor, to monitor the
debtor to determine the most advantageous time to foreclose on a loan when the financing
agreement authorized the creditor to monitor the debtor in the event of a default.36 The court was
further persuaded that the other unsecured creditors knew there was no guarantee that the secured
creditor would continue to finance the debtor, and they knew that the secured creditor could
foreclose at any time.37
C. Insiders are More likely to have Engaged in Inequitable Conduct due to Courts
Applying Stricter Scrutiny.
There are three categories of misconduct that are generally recognized as inequitable
conduct for insiders: (1) fraud, illegality, and breach of fiduciary duties; (2) undercapitalization;
and (3) claimant’s use of the debtor as a mere instrumentality or alter ego.38 Undercapitalization
alone is generally not sufficient to equitably subordinate a claim.39 However, an insider loaning
money to an undercapitalized corporation may be enough to constitute inequitable conduct when
the insider fails to inject capital into the corporation, and no third party is willing to loan the
corporation money.40 An insider exercising its contractual rights is generally not a defense to
inequitable conduct.41

34

Id. at 120.
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
In re Mid-Am. Waste Sys., 284 B.R. 53, 71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
39
Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Foods, Inc. (In re Herby's Foods, Inc.), 2 F.3d 128, 132 (5th Cir. 1993).
40
Id.
41
See Shubert v. Lucent Techs. Inc (In re Winstar Commc’ns., Inc.), 554 F.3d 382, 412 (3d Cir. 2009).
35
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Insiders commit inequitable conduct when the insider uses its power to control the debtor
for its own advantage.42 In Citicorp, the Third Circuit held that an insider committed inequitable
conduct by purchasing unsecured claims which the insider then used to benefit its own position
in the bankruptcy case to the detriment of the other creditors.43 In that instance, the insider used
confidential information to buy claims to object to a Chapter 11 plan and force an asset sale that
would benefit the insider.44 According to the court, the insider breached its fiduciary duty by
engaging in such conduct.45 In Herby’s Foods, the Fifth Circuit equitably subordinated the claim
of an insider because the insider, the parent company of the debtor, loaned money to the debtor
corporation that was undercapitalized.46 The court reasoned that the loan was inequitable because
the insider parent company knew the debtor was undercapitalized, insolvent, the insider parent
company never injected any capital into the debtor, and no other third-party lender was willing to
loan Herby’s money because of its poor financial position.47
II.

Courts Still Must find that Inequitable Conduct Caused Harm or Conferred an
Unfair Advantage to Subordinate a Claim.
Inequitable conduct must have caused an injury to the creditors of the debtor, or

conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant to subordinate a claim.48 The inequitable conduct
does not need to be a major cause of the debtor filing for bankruptcy relief.49 The party seeking
equitable subordination needs to demonstrate that the claimant’s conduct harmed the debtor or

42

See Citicorp Venture Cap., Ltd. v. Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 160 F.3d 982, 986 (3d Cir.
1998).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 985–86.
46
Herby's Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d at 132.
47
Id.
48
In re Winstar Commc’ns, Inc., 554 F.3d at 411.
49
See In re Mid-Am. Waste Sys., 284 B.R. 53, 71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
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another creditor.50 A claim should be subordinated in proportion to the extent of the harm the
inequitable conduct caused to other creditors.51 Good faith is not a defense to causing injury
because it does not “negate the harm sustained by . . . creditors; neither would it lessen the
advantage gained by the [i]nsiders.”52 Courts often determine there was an injury to another
creditor or the claimant obtained some unfair advantage after the court determines there was
inequitable conduct.53 In Winstar, the court found equitable subordination was warranted
because the inequitable conduct caused the debtor to purchase unneeded equipment.54 Further,
the Winstar court found an injury to other creditors because the claimant purposefully delayed
issuing its refinancing notice in order to induce the other creditors to invest in the debtor.55
Additionally, the Citicorp Court found that the inequitable conduct caused damage to other
creditors because it delayed a proposed plan of reorganization in order to propose its own plan.56
Finally, in Herby’s Foods, the court determined the debtor’s inequitable conduct, characterizing
equity contributions as loans, injured the other creditors because it increased their credit
exposure.57 The insiders used their position, to encourage the other creditors to increase their
credit exposure which ultimately harmed those other creditors.58 Further, the other creditors were
also injured by the inequitable conduct because their percentage of the distribution in the
bankruptcy was reduced because the debtors characterized equity contributions as loans.59

50

Id.
See Citicorp Venture Cap., 160 F.3d at 991.
52
Herby's Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d at 132.
53
See, e.g., Estes v. N & D Props., Inc. (In re N & D Props., Inc.), 799 F.2d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Winstar
Commc’ns, Inc., 554 F.3d at 414; Citicorp Venture Cap., 160 F.3d 982 at 990.
54
In re Winstar Commc’ns, Inc., 554 F.3d at 414.
55
Id.
56
Citicorp Venture Cap., 160 F.3d at 990.
57
Herby's Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d at 134.
58
Id.
59
Id.
51
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Conclusion
Courts consider the impact the inequitable conduct had on the debtor or other creditors in
determining if there was any harm. Insiders are subject to stricter scrutiny than non-insiders and
courts are more likely to find that insiders engaged in inequitable conduct because of the
heightened scrutiny. Creditors ought to refrain from exercising control over their debtors so a
court will not deem the creditor an insider. Whether there has been inequitable conduct is highly
fact dependent and case specific, but once a court finds inequitable conduct, the court still must
find that the inequitable conduct caused some harm or conferred an unfair advantage of the
claimant.
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